Coltescu considered that "In its esence, philosophy is this reflection, this meditation by which we want to understand, to distinguish the sense of world and of our proper existence---and by understanding, to liberate us, to conquer our spiritual autonomy"(Coltescu 2002, p.21). Most philosophers had considered that philosophy is a knowledge, differences appear either concerning its object( first principles, the absolute, the universal etc.) or its method (by concepts to Kant) or its faculty(reason, senses etc). But, is philosophy limited just to a form of contemplative knowledge disinterested from a practical or applicative point of view? Tudosescu considers that" only in limits in which it conditionate value reedifications at the level of other forms of social conscience and, respective, modifications in the structure of the tables of cultural values, so that these to stimulate changes whith deep character in the structure and dynamics of civilizations, we can say that philosophy have an applicative character"(Tudosescu 1997, p.169). Someones had emphasized the propensity towards universality, the tendency to cover the whole reality: philosophy is a general conception about the world; it tries to discern the most general determinations of reality, that is of nature, society and thinking. But, neither thought is an universal characteristic of univers nor society. The most general determinations of world concern either the fundamental-necessary level of reality, substance, microphysics level, or some characteristics of the univers as a whole, like evolution or cosmic becoming. Others considered that, philosophy studies existence in its totality . But Beaufret have written about Wollf:"Wollf is proposing for himself therefore to make the census of essentialias, that is of all that it can be said about being as being. This science is, by consequence, the science of being as posibility .One can talk about being without to say a word about its existence. The last is just a "complementum posibilitatis", a complement of posibility."(Beaufret 1998, p.11). On the other hand, there are special philosophies, as ethics or ethical philosophy, which are quasi-disinterested about some ontic or ontological aspects of reality. There is some autonomy between some philosophical disciplines, such as there is a certain freedom in human life. An alternative characterization of philosophy concerns its aims. Thus, for Rescher the characteristic aims of philosophy are: (i) Provide answers to those domain definitive questions, that is, propound and comunicate information that conveys these answers . ( We want answers.) (ii) Seek for cogency, that is, fit those answers out with a rationale that attains cogency and conviction by way of evidentiation, substantiation, and demonstration. (We want not just answers but answers worthy of acceptance.) (iii) Strive for rational economy, pursuing the tasks at issue in points (i) and (ii) in a way that is rationally satisfacatory, that is, in an efficient, effective, economical
The general characterization problem of philosophy relative to its particular domains or of its specific relative to other cultural forms---art, religion, science---is a metaphilosophical one. But, how it can be justified this diversity of opinions about the esence of philosophy? Coltescu had considered that: "The two levels of philosophy, [first-order philosophy and metaphilosophy] are in interaction, are situated in a circularity raport, the thinkers options in the plane of proper philosophy having effects on their metaphilosophical conceptions and, converse, their metaphilosophical conceptions influence their investigations in the plane of proper philosohy."(Coltescu, 2002, p.18-19).
About the antireduction of philosophy, science, mind and imortality
Like Vacariu et al (2001, p.275), I consider that the previous characterizations are partly correct but they concern philosophy from a single perspective, sometimes from a reductionist point of view. They can be considered as quasi-complementary. However, previous characterizations, either in particular or taken all together simultaneouslly, do not succed to surprise all that was, all that is, all that will be, all that can be philosophy. But, until to what limits can be philosophy extended and developed? What is philosophy? Or, can be it unificated? If an unification by reduction at one of the previous characterizations is inacceptable, still remain a posibility of unification not by reduction but by an ultimate persistent aim, ideal. I will ilustrate this with an example from philosophy of science. Popper considered that truth is the regulative ideal of science, and in this sense truth may have an unificatory role, relative to various special sciences, as a common aim, ideal, tack toward all the scientific propensities converge. But, truth single maybe is a too strong criterion of scientificity and is not enough as an ideal of science, because the common statements as "the sun is brilliant" are not veritable scientific statements, because they are too common-truths. More constrains are needed. In addition, science should to pursue also sistematic explanation, the laws and the freedom grades of universe at all its levels, from microcosmos to individual human conscience, society and macrocosmos.
Against antistructural reductionism
Fetzer assume that science aims at the discovery of laws of nature that have the form of general principles that are applicabile for the purposes of explanation and prediction. On the other hand, science should not to prefere simplicity and economy necessarly. Simpler theories ought to be prefered to complex alternatives only in the cases in wich they are also adequate, truth. I addition, we do not know a priori that reality is simple. Other think that, science tend towards unity(cf. Gold and Stoljar, 1999). However, science should to pursue unity only in the case in wich world is realy unitary. But, we do not know a priori that universe have an ultimate universal unity. This aims are preferable but they are contingent aims, thereby they have a contingent scientific value. Maybe, the universe have a fundamental ontological level wich have a necessary existence, and consequently is universal, for/in every posible world, but the universe unity should not be identified with the unity of science. The unity of universe exist at the fundamental ontological level, but the unity of human science is at the level of human conscious level. The human consciousness is something that exist at an upper ontological level, that depend on a more complex level of organization. If the "elementary particles" are not elementary, if there exist an ultimate unique-type-of-ontological-primitive, however, "organization is a property wich cannot be reduced to the properties of its parts, for the behavior of each part depends on those of the others and on the aims of the whole."(Del Re, 1998). By previous phrase I have not intentioned to defend the autonomy of chemistry, biology or of psychology against microphysics's imperialism. I only intended to criticize the tendency to reduce all the emergent properties of systems with complex organization to the sums of the properties of their microparts. I disageed whith idea that all the phenomena from superior organizational complexity levels supervene as simple sums of the phenomena from lower levels.
The superior cognitive capacities of human brain are absent at the single neuron level, that is neurons are not small brains. Brain is not a big neuron.
For exemple, if we take two thousand of resistors and we try to connect them in all posibile structures, we know that there is only one unnecessary structure, wich is total serial, in wich the total resistance, the phenomenon from higher level, is the sum of the resistance of each resistor, or the sum of the properties of phenomena from the lower level, but in structures that involve parallel conected resistors, the total resistance is not a simple sum of the resistance of individual resistors. The property that is comon both to the higher level and to the lower level is "resistitivity".
